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STANFORD v. KENTUCKY, WILKINS v. MISSOURI
109 S. Ct. 2969, 106 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1989)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS
On January 7, 1981 Kevin Stanford raped, sodonized, and shot
to death 20-year old Baerbel Poore in connection with robbing the
gas station where Poore worked. Stanford laughed while explaining
to a corrections officer that Poore was Stanford's neighbor and could
identify him unless killed. Stanford was 17 years and 4 months of
age at the time of the murder.
Kentucky law allows juveniles over 16 years of age and
charged with a felony to be tried as an adult. In considering this law
the Kentucky legislature had examined the possibility of a juvenile
receiving a capital sentence. The juvenile court certified Stanford to
stand trial as an adult.
Heath Wilkins pled guilty to murdering Nancy Allen on July
27, 1985 while robbing her convenience store. Wilkins requested and
received the death penalty. Wilkins was 16 years and 6 months of
age when he murdered Allen.
Missouri law allows for certification ofjuveniles to stand trial
as adults. The Missouri legislature had never directly examined
whether juveniles could be sentenced to death. The juvenile court
certified Wilkins to stand trial as an adult.
Both Stanford and Wilkins had previous juvenile adjudications.
The transferring court found that the state was incapable of rehabilitating Stanford or Wilkins based upon previous lack of success.

HOLDING
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide
whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" precludes death-eligibility for 16 or 17 year olds
and younger as a class.
The Court affirmed both death sentences. In examining the
issue of death eligibility for all juveniles as a class, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, first looked to common law tradition. A
rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit a felony at 14 years
of age prevailed at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the framers would not have considered death-eligibility
for juveniles above age 14 "cruel and unusual punishment".
All members of the court agree that whether or not a contemporary punishment is cruel and unusual for Eighth Amendment
purposes depends upon the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). By examining objective standards the Court purposed to find
whether a national consensus against death-eligibility for all juveniles
exists.
The Court held the determinative objective standard to be the
action of state legislatures. The Court found that no consensus
against death-eligibility for all juvenile offenders exists since 22
states under current statutes would allow 16 year olds to receive a
death sentence.
The separate opinions including the dissent counted the death
penalty states and related statistics much differently. One point of
contention centered around the fact that states with no death penalty
statutes and states declining to carry out capital sentences substantially outnumber the states which have executed offenders in modem
times.
The Court also accepted the actions of juries as objective indicators of evolving standards of decency. Evidence that a lower
percentage of offenders under the age of 18 receive a death sentence

than offenders over the age of 18 failed to convince the Court of the
existence of a national consensus against imposing the death penalty
upon any juvenile offender. The fact that some juries were willing to
impose the death penalty upon juveniles argued against the existence
of the national consensus.
In Justice Scalia's plurality opinion such indicators as the age
state legislatures allow young people to engage in voting, driving, or
drinking were seen as irrelevant in determining the existence of a
national consensus regarding death-eligibility for juvenile offenders.
Non-legislative evidence such as public opinion polls, views of
interest groups, and positions adopted by professional groups were
also held to be totally irrelevant.
Determining whether a punishment violates any substantive
Eighth Amendment rights also involves evaluating the punishment in
light of the legitimate goals of penology. These goals regarding the
death penalty are deterrence and retribution.
Appellants argued that if juveniles are not capable of being
deterred by the death penalty because they are not sufficiently
developed to appreciate the finality of death, no penological goal
would be served by executing juveniles. In failing to achieve its goal
of deterrence, death-eligibility for juvenile offenders would rest upon
no acceptable justification, necessarily violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court held against this argument.
Appellants further argued that retribution would be disproportionate to the offense where the offenders are not completely
developed psychologically, thus less morally blameworthy for their
crimes, undeserving of the ultimate retributive act. The Court held
that procedures for individualized consideration, being an integral
part of the imposition of the death penalty for any offender, would be
sufficient to determine moral blameworthiness. If mitigation
evidence indicates insufficient development for a death sentence to
be proportionate, juries must be free to impose a non-capital
sentence. Individual examination was the key for the plurality. The
Court refused to hold that juvenile offenders as a class are insufficiently developed psychologically to deserve the death penalty.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the result, referred to her concurrence in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2687,
101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988). In Thompson, Justice O'Connor wrote that
she believed a national consensus against executing 15 year olds and
younger might very well exist, but she was unwilling to hold categorically that it did in fact exist. She wanted to look to the state
legislatures in order to determine the existence of such a consensus.
She wrote that unless a state legislature had specifically voted to
allow the execution of 15 year olds, no death sentences of 15 year
olds should be upheld. In the cases at bar, enough state legislatures
had specifically voted to allow execution of 16 and 17 year olds that
she perceived no national consensus against it.
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality on the issue of
proper indicia for considering evolving standards. She argued that
the Court should consider the ages the state legislatures allow young
people to engage in voting, drinking, and driving as well as the
fulfillment of penological goals.
ANALYSIS
The primary effect of these decisions in Virginia, which has
not legislatively determined a minimum age for the death penalty, is
that the death penalty statute does not have to be reexamined by the
General Assembly in order for 16 or 17 year olds to be executed.
Thompson had established that death-eligibility solely created by
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waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in capital cases involving 15 year
olds was unacceptable under Trop. Thompson still means that
Virginia cannot execute 15 year olds unless the General Assembly
votes to allow it. However, Justice O'Connor in the cases at bar was
not persuaded that a national consensus exists against executing 16 or
17 year olds. Therefore the state legislatures are not required
specifically to authorize their execution,
Also Stanford establishes the supreme importance of presenting a persuasive, individualized case in mitigation. The entire Court
held that some 16 and 17 year old offenders may be so undeveloped
that they are not sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the death

penalty. In Virginia, age is a statutorily enumerated mitigating
factor. The plurality held that finding lack of moral blameworthiness
is the jury's responsibility. Thus the defense must persuade the jury
during individual examination that the defendant is not sufficiently
blameworthy to impose the death penalty. The dissenters mentioned
societal shared blame for the crimes of young offenders with
disastrous childhoods. The plurality did not discount the value of
such mitigating evidence. It held that all mitigation evidence is for
the jury to examine and evaluate.
Summary and alaysis by: Kerry D. Lee

SOUTH CAROLINA v. GATHERS
109 S. Ct. 2207,104 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
In a five to four decision the Supreme Court (Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and White [concurring]), held that a prosecutor's comments pertaining to personal
characteristics of the victim made during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial were irrelevant to the sentencing decision, and necessitated a new sentencing hearing. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined. Justice Scalia filed a separate dissent.

FACTS
Demetrius Gathers and several accomplices had been walking
through a park when they encountered the victim, Richard Haynes.
After Haynes failed to respond to Gathers' attempt to start a conversation, Gathers and his friends beat the victim severely. While the
victim was apparently unconscious, Gathers forced an umbrella into
the victim's anus causing a perforated rectum. A short time later
Gathers returned to the scene, stabbed the victim, and proceeded to
search through his belongings in an attempt to find something of
value to steal.
Gathers was convicted in the General Sessions Court of
Charleston County on the charges of murder and first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. He was sentenced to death during the sentencing
phase of South Carolina's bifurcated capital trial system. He appealed
to the Supreme Court of South Carolina which affirmed his conviction, but reversed the death sentence. In its decision the court cited
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529,96 L. Ed. 2d 440
(1987), and held that comments made by the prosecution during its
closing arguments deprived Gathers of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by allowing the jury to consider evidence that was
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. State v. Gathers,295 S.C. 476,
369 S.E.2d 140 (1988). South Carolina petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari, and in an opinion filed by Justice Brennan the Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal of the death sentence.

HOLDING
In the plurality opinion, the Court affirmed the reversal of
Gathers' death sentence and restated its holding in Enmundv.
Florida, that "'for purposes of imposing the death penalty,., the
defendant's punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt.' Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210, quoting Enmund v.
Florida,458 U.S. 782, (1982)), 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140.

ANALYSIS
In Gathers,the prosecution's closing arguments encouraged the
jury to draw inferences about the victim's personal life from items he
had in his possession at the time of his death. In particular, the
prosecutor drew elaborate analogies to the victim's character from a
laminated prayer and a voter registration card. Both of these items,
the Court pointed out, were unlikely to have been seen or read by the
accused. In holding that this evidence was irrelevant to the sentencing
decision, the Court stated that "the content of the various papers ...
was purely fortuitous, and cannot provide any information relevant to
the defendant's moral culpability... [and] their content cannot be
said to relate directly to the circumstances of the crime." Id. at 2211.
Although the Court stated that the content of the items was irrelevant,
it indicated that the act of searching through the victim's belongings
and callously scattering them about, was a proper factor to be
considered by the jury. However, because the evidence showed that
Gathers had no knowledge of the victim's possessions or background
when he made his decision to kill, prosecutorial comment beyond the
act itself was improper.
In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on its previous
holding in Booth v. Maryland,482 U.S. 496 (1987). In Booth, the
Court held that the use of a victim impact statement during the
sentencing phase of a capital trial was improper because it focused on
the victim, and on "factors about which the defendant was unaware,
and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill." Id. at 505. Specifically, the victim impact statements in Booth were a compilation of
the emotional, physical and economic harm which the family suffered
as a result of the killing of their parents.
The holding and analysis in Booth was also relevant to Gathers'
claim that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been
violated by allowing the jury to administer arbitrary and capricious
punishments. The Court in Booth held that the admission of irrelevant
evidence, similar to the evidence admitted in Gathers,"creates a
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. at 503. The Court
reasoned that the admission of such evidence could foster arbitrary
findings by: 1) "divert[ing] the jury's attention away from the
defendant's background ...and the circumstances of the crime"; and
2) by the random variations of each family's communicative abilities
"in expressing their grief." Id. at 505. "iThere [is no] justification for
permitting such a decision [life or death] to turn on the perception
that the victim was a sterling member of the community rather than
someone of questionable character." Id. at 506.
The holdings in Booth and Gathers are somewhat analogous to
the holding in Californiav. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93
L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987). In Brown, the Court held that it was pennis-

